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1. Introduction 
Enlargement is often called the most successful foreign policy of the European Union 
(EU). The attractiveness of EU membership and the strict conditionality attached to the 
accession process have vested the EU with considerable transformative power in the 
applicant countries (Grabbe 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005). After the 
breakdown of Soviet communism and hegemony in Eastern Europe, enlargement has 
been credited with having contributed significantly to economic recovery, peace and 
stability as well as democratization in the transition countries of the region.  
 
With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, the Fifth Enlargement of 
the EU has been completed. Whereas the Western Balkans and Turkey continue to have a 
membership perspective, the EU has devised the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 
for the remaining countries of Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean as an alternative to 
accession. It remains to be seen, however, whether ENP will be able to produce similarly 
positive effects as enlargement. This policy question provides the practical interest we 
have in this paper.  
 
In recent years, the comparative study of EU democracy promotion has become the 
subject of several book-length studies.
1 These studies concur on a number of substantive 
findings.  Most of all, they agree that accession conditionality has been paramount. First, 
accession conditionality, that is, the credible perspective of becoming an EU member 
after thorough democratic reform, was the most effective among the EU’s strategies and 
                                                 
1 See Kelley 2004; Kubicek 2003; Pridham 2005; Schimmelfennig et al. 2006; Vachudova 2005; 
Youngs 2001a.   3
instruments of democracy promotion. Second, outside of Europe, where the target 
countries of EU democracy promotion did not have a membership perspective, the EU 
used its political conditionality inconsistently and rather unsuccessfully on the whole 
(Youngs 2001a; 2001b). In sum, while even highly credible accession conditionality 
requires favorable domestic political conditions in the target countries to be fully 
effective, it has proven to be a necessary condition of successful EU democracy 
promotion. And while this literature would not claim that EU accession conditionality 
was more important than domestic conditions of democratization, it demonstrates that in 
many cases the EU’s external incentives have been instrumental in removing domestic 
obstacles to further democratic reform. 
 
In addition, the recent studies of EU democracy promotion share several theoretical and 
methodological characteristics. First, they generally adhere to the agency-oriented 
approach of transition theory, which focus on strategic constellations and political 
choices of state leaders and challengers to explain regime change and its outcomes (see 
e.g. O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Przeworski 1991). In this perspective, the EU is 
conceived of as an (additional) actor in the transition process, which provides external 
restrictions and opportunities to the choices of elites and counter-elites. Second, the 
studies are mainly based on comparative case study designs and have focused empirically 
on the candidates for EU membership.
2  
 
                                                 
2 The work of Richard Youngs (Youngs 2001a) is the exception. Yet he does not systematically 
compare candidates for membership and other outsiders.   4
Consequently, the recent literature on EU democracy promotion may be accused of two 
major design problems potentially leading to bias and limited generality. On the one 
hand, in their focus on EU agency and EU interaction with domestic elites in the target 
countries, these studies do not control for socioeconomic modernization as an additional 
or alternative and, as modernization theorists would claim, more fundamental cause of 
democratization. In addition, the emphasis on the EU as an international organization and 
its strategy of conditionality may sideline general diffusion and linkage effects having to 
do with other transnational and international actors and interactions As a consequence, 
the studies of EU democracy promotion may systematically overestimate the relevance of 
EU incentives in the democratization process and, technically speaking, introduce 
omitted variable bias into the analysis. Second, the empirical focus on Eastern European 
countries with a general membership perspective (and thus favorable conditions of EU 
impact) introduces uncertainty into the findings and may limit their generality. How does 
variation in the size and credibility of EU conditionality impact on its effectiveness? 
 
In this paper, we address these potential sources of bias and uncertainty. On the one hand, 
we systematically include in our analysis core variables of modernization theory as well 
as several proxies for diffuse international and transnational influences beyond the 
specific incentives of the EU. Second, we extend the study to 36 countries of the 
“European neighborhood” and thus to almost all post-communist and Mediterranean 
countries from the late 1980s to the beginning of the 21
st century. Finally, in order to deal 
with this expanded data set, we move from comparative case studies to a panel regression 
analysis.    5
 
The main objective of the study is to show that credible EU accession conditionality still 
proves to be a strong and significant factor in European democratization processes if the 
entire region is taken into account and if core alternative explanations are controlled for. 
By the same token, however, the study suggests that  the impact of EU democracy 
promotion will be severely weakened where EU incentives are small – as is the case for 
those countries of the European neighborhood that do not have a membership 
perspective. The good news for theory is bad news for policy. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents conditionality, 
economic development, and transnational linkages as alternative and complementary 
mechanisms of democratization. Section 3 presents the design and section 4 the results of 
the analysis. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.   Mechanisms of democratization: conditionality, modernization and linkage 
In this section, we present three different mechanisms of democratization, which are 
potentially influential in the EU’s European neighborhood. We start with conditionality, 
the main mechanism under study here. We then present two alternative mechanisms: 
modernization and linkage. At the end of the section, we discuss potential causal 
connections between these mechanisms.   6
  
Conditionality 
In using political conditionality, the EU sets the adoption of democratic rules and 
practices as conditions that the target countries have to fulfill in order to receive rewards 
such as financial assistance, some kind of contractual association, or – ultimately – 
membership. EU conditionality is mainly “positive”, that is, the EU offers and withholds 
carrots but does not carry a big stick.  Countries that fail to meet the criteria are simply 
denied assistance, association or membership and left behind in the competition for EU 
funds and the “regatta” for accession. The EU generally does not inflict extra punishment 
(in addition to withholding the conditional reward) on non-compliant governments. 
Moreover, the EU does not give extra support to those who fail to meet the conditions 
either. Rather, it regularly exhorts the target governments that it is their own 
responsibility to create the conditions to be rewarded.
3  
 
The most general political conditionality hypothesis is: The positive impact of the EU on 
democracy in outsider states increases with the size and the credibility of the EU’s 
conditional incentives.  
 
In general, adopting liberal political norms (such as human rights, democratic elections, 
open contestation for offices, and the rule of law) constitutes a loss in autonomy and 
power for the target governments. These political disincentives need to be balanced in 
kind by tangible incentives such as military protection or economic assistance to improve 
the security and the welfare of the state. In addition, effectiveness will increase with size. 
                                                 
3 On EU political conditionality, see Schimmelfennig et al. 2006: 31-41.   7
Accordingly, the promise of enlargement should be more powerful than the promise of 
association or assistance, and the impact of the EU on candidates for membership should 
be stronger than on outside states not considered potential EU members. Only the highest 
international rewards – those associated with EU membership – can be expected to 
balance substantial domestic power costs. 
 
Finally, the rewards need to be credible both with regard to the EU’s threat to withhold 
rewards in case of non-compliance and, conversely, the credibility of the EU’s promise to 
deliver the reward in case of compliance. In other words, rule adoption requires both the 
superior bargaining power of the rule-setting agency (otherwise threats would not be 
credible) and certainty, on the part of the target states, that they will receive the payment 
once they have met the political conditions (otherwise promises would not be credible). 
In general, the credibility of the threat to withhold rewards has always been present in the 
relations between the EU and its neighborhood. Interdependence is highly asymmetrical 
in favor of the EU. Whereas the neighboring countries are only of marginal importance to 
the EU economy, they are often heavily dependent on the EU market and will benefit 
much more strongly from association and accession than the EU member states 
(Moravcsik and Vachudova 2005: 201). Thus, the threat of exclusion, if conditions were 
not fulfilled, has always been credible. 
 
On the other hand, however, the EU must be capable and willing to pay the rewards. The 
higher the costs of the rewards to the EU are, the more doubtful their eventual payment to 
the target countries will be. On the basis of this reasoning, assistance and association   8
have generally been more credible rewards than accession because the commitment on 
the part of the EU is low. By contrast, Eastern enlargement involves substantial costs to 
the organization, which – although far from being prohibitive – are likely to exceed the 
marginal benefits of most member states (Schimmelfennig 2003: 52-66).  
 
However, one also has to take into account the “sunk costs” of rewarding. In contrast to 
assistance, which requires comparatively small investments on the part of the EU and can 
be stopped rather easily, enlargement involves costly, long-term negotiations and 
preparations and a restructuring of EU institutions and policies. The more the pre-
accession process advances, the higher are the costs of withholding the reward, that is, 
the investments that would be lost if the process was broken off or postponed to sanction 
a candidate state. After de Gaulle’s veto against UK membership in 1963, the EU has 
never broken off accession negotiations. The credibility of conditional rewards therefore 
increases considerably with the opening of accession negotiations. Even for countries not 
yet involved in accession negotiations, the opening of accession negotiations with, and 
the subsequent accession of, a first group of candidate countries increases the credibility 
of rewards for the remaining candidates, as it demonstrates that the EU is serious about 
enlargement. 
 
It took several years, indeed, to overcome the reticence and opposition of a majority of 
member governments and to commit the EU firmly to enlargement. It was not before 
1993 that the EU had made a general decision to accept new members from the transition 
countries and it took the EU until 1997 to open accession negotiations with the   9
democratically most consolidated states among them. These decisions greatly 
strengthened the credibility of both the promise to enlarge and the threat to exclude 
reform laggards – and the impact of political conditionality on those countries that were 
not allowed to participate in the first round of negotiations. 
 
In sum, we claim that the impact of the EU on democratization in the neighboring 
countries will be a function of the size and credibility of the rewards that it offers in 
return for democratization steps.  
 
Modernization 
According to modernization theory, democracy is a function of the level of social and 
economic development of a country. In his pioneering work, Seymour Martin Lipset 
(1959; 1960) studied the “social conditions” or “requisites” that support democracy and 
identified “economic development”, broadly understood as a syndrome of wealth, 
industrialization, urbanization, and education, as the most important one. Economic 
development goes together with better education, less poverty, the creation of a large 
middle-class, and a competent civil service. It thereby mitigates the class struggle and 
promotes cross-cutting cleavages. In addition, it nurtures a belief in tolerance and 
gradualism and reduces commitment to extremist ideologies. In sum: “The more well-to-
do a nation, the greater the chances that it will sustain democracy” (Lipset 1960: 31).  
 
The relationship between economic well-being and democracy has been tested on the 
basis of various indicators, methods and in comparison with many alternative factors but   10
has proven highly robust (Diamond 1992; Lipset 1994). More recent analyses have 
sought to disentangle the correlation between economic development and democracy – 
whether economic development brings about and/or rather sustains and consolidates 
democracy (see Przeworski et al. 2000 vs. Boix and Stokes 2003) – and the causal 
mechanisms linking the two
4 but left Lipset’s main hypothesis intact. As a mechanism 
that emphasizes domestic, societal, and bottom-up factors of democratization, 
modernization provides the starkest contrast to conditionality as an international, 
political, and top-down mechanism.  
 
Linkage 
Even if one accepts that democratization does not only depend on domestic conditions 
but is also conditional on international factors, one may still doubt that intergovernmental 
organizations, and IGO conditionality in particular, are the most relevant influence. 
Democracy-promoting influences may also stem from transnational relations, that is, 
cross-border interactions and exchanges, in which at least one side is non-governmental. 
Just as in modernization, democracy promotion is predominantly societal and bottom-up 
but it is, at the same time, international rather than domestic. We subsume such 
transnational influences under the term “linkage” (Levitsky and Way 2005). Channels 
and instruments of linkage can be highly diverse. They comprise economic exchanges 
such as trade and investment, personal interactions through various means of 
communication, tourism, or academic exchanges, or cultural and information influences 
via the media, churches, or cultural performances. 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Boix (2003); Inglehart and Welzel (2005). For an overview of the literature, see 
Wucherpfennig (2007).   11
 
The effects of these interactions and exchanges on democratization are diverse as well. 
Some of them are direct and short-term in the sense that they have an immediate impact 
on the political struggle between pro- and anti-democratic forces in the country. 
Newspapers and broadcasts from abroad and external financial and technical support for 
the opponents are examples. International demonstration effects generated by successful 
democratic transitions in another country may encourage the democratic opposition and 
counter-elites to push for democratization. Other effects, however, work indirectly and in 
the longer term. The intensification of trade, for instance, may make society more 
affluent and induce societal groups to demand civil liberties and political rights. It also 
brings people from established democracies in contact with people from non-democratic 
countries, thus facilitating the spread of ideas and change of attitudes. The same can be 
expected from non-economic interactions such as cultural and academic exchanges 
increasing the level of education as a social requisite of democracy or constituting a 
channel for transmitting beliefs and desires that favor democratization. As a general 
hypothesizes subsuming the various channels, instruments and effects of linkage, we 
propose that the level of democracy in a country increases with the intensity of the 
transnational linkages that it entertains with (other) democratic countries in its 
international environment. 
 
Causal interactions 
Theoretically, we can think of several ways in which these mechanisms influence 
democratization in the European Neighborhood. To some extent, we assume them to   12
work independently of each other. In this perspective, and under the conditions specified 
for each mechanism, conditionality, economic development, and linkage each contribute 
their share to overall progress in democracy. In addition, however, it seems plausible to 
assume that conditionality interacts in two ways with modernization, on the one hand, 
and linkage, on the other. 
 
First, conditionality may have a causal impact on both economic development and 
linkage. Certainly, conditional EU assistance, cooperation, and market access are likely 
to contribute to the wealth of nonmember countries and to the intensity of transnational 
linkages and thereby strengthen these alternative mechanisms of democratization. For 
two reasons, however, we do no think that this causal interaction poses a serious problem 
for our study. On the one hand, conditionality contributes significantly to economic 
development and linkage after political conditions have been fulfilled. That is, target 
countries have to reach certain levels of democracy before assistance, cooperation and 
market access are granted or enhanced. That is, for each level of incentives offered, 
conditionality will have an impact on democracy ahead of having an impact on either 
economic development or linkage. Therefore, the effects of conditionality can be largely 
separated from those of the other mechanisms and endogeneity problems should not loom 
large. On the other hand, the remaining interactions (and endogeneity) would lead the 
analysis to understate rather than overstate the independent effects of conditionality that 
we seek to establish. 
   13
Second, economic development and linkage may have a causal impact on both 
conditionality and democracy. One may assume that high economic development and 
intense transnational interactions will lead the EU to offer high and credible incentives to 
the target countries of democracy promotion. This would reduce the relationship between 
conditionality and democracy to a (partially) spurious one. It is exactly for this reason 
that we include economic development and linkage in our empirical model. 
 
3. Design 
The study covers 36 countries of the EU’s neighborhood from 1988 – just before the start 
of the “fourth wave” of democratization in Eastern Europe. The countries comprise the 
post-communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe as well as the “Mediterranean 
neighbors” or Northern Africa and the Middle East (see Appendix A). Our observations 
relate to countries according to the political boundaries of 2002. To avoid sample-biased 
results in the comparison of different mechanisms, we strived to obtain a rectangular data 
set. We describe newly independent states with the values of the faded super-structure. 
Because of severe data problems, however, Libya as well as the Palestinian Authority 
(West Bank and Gaza) were dropped from the analysis. 
 
The dependent variable “democracy” is measured by the Political Rights rating of 
Freedom House (2005). To obtain interpretable results, data are reversed to a scale from 0 
(no democracy) to 6 (full democracy). Data are available from 1988 for all countries 
which were independent by then, from 1990 for Czech Republic and Slovenia, from 1991 
for (almost all of) the other successor states of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and   14
Czechoslovakia. In some countries (Bulgaria, Algeria, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey), “turmoil” 
is reported for 1990, and we therefore imputed the value for 1989. To test for the 
robustness of our findings, one set of estimates uses the Civil Liberties rather than the 
Political Rights score by Freedom House, and another set of estimates excludes all those 
countries from the analysis, in which democratization was already far advanced or 
consolidated. These are countries rated as “free” by Freedom House (democracy values 
of 5 and 6 according to our scale) for a given year.  
 
For conditionality, we refined the conceptualization used in Schimmelfennig et al. (2006) 
as shown in Table 1. The size and credibility of incentives refer to the time during which 
they were offered to the target countries as the highest available incentives (see Appendix 
B for the distribution of country-years across these categories). They remain valid even 
after the target countries have been granted association or membership because treaties 
with third countries can be suspended, and members can be deprived of their voting 
rights, when they violate fundamental democratic norms.  
 
In 1988, the starting year of our analysis, the Eastern European countries were generally 
without any tangible incentives provided by the EU (“0”). Before the launch of the 
Barcelona process in 1995, EU relations with the Mediterranean countries were 
conducted under cooperation agreements with minor tangible incentives and no political 
conditionality (“1/0”). Since the early 1990s, political conditionality has been a general 
feature of the EU’s external agreements; but they still differed with regard to the 
credibility of the threats and promises attached to them.    15
 
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) offered to all countries of the 
former Soviet Union combine minor incentives with a low credibility of the threat to 
withhold them in case of political non-compliance (“1/1”).
5 Minor incentives combined 
with high credibility characterized EU relations with Central and Eastern European 
countries (CEECs) to the West of the former Soviet Union before the EU offered them 
Europe Agreements of Association (“1/2”). Once they had the chance to sign Europe 
Agreements, the size of incentives increased (“2/2”). These association agreements were 
not only linked to rather strict political conditionality (credibility of the threat), they also 
raised the expectations of eventual membership (credibility of the promise). By contrast, 
the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements offered similar incentives but without 
the same strict political conditionality and without the same membership perspective 
(“2/1”).  
 
Table 1  Incentives in EU political conditionality 
  Size of incentives  Credibility of incentives 
0  No tangible incentives  No or weak political 
conditionality 
1  Partnership (minor economic and financial 
incentives) 
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 
Political conditionality 
with low credibility of 
threats and/or promises 
2  Association (including market access, financial 
assistance) 
Europe Agreements, Euro-Mediterranean 
Association Agreements, Stabilization and 
Association Agreements 
Political conditionality 
with high credibility of 
threats and/or promises 
3  Membership 
Pre-Accession policies, accession negotiations 
 
                                                 
5 The exception is Belarus, which the EU has enforced conditionality more strictly than elsewhere 
in the former Soviet Union.   16
 
From 1993, the EU granted the CEECs a general membership perspective, which, 
however, was not credible for all CEECs from the beginning (“3/1”). Credibility had 
been high for the Central European countries from 1993; it became high for the Baltic 
countries as well as Bulgaria and Romania in 1997 and for Turkey after the Helsinki 
Council of 1999 (“3/2”). At that time, the Western Balkans also obtained a general 
accession perspective (“3/1”). 
 
According to our theoretical considerations, the effect of conditionality on 
democratization is best conceived of as an interaction effect of the size and credibility of 
EU incentives. High incentives are a necessary but not sufficient condition of EU impact 
unless these incentives are also credible. Equally, highly credible but substantively small 
rewards will not be an effective lever for democratic reforms. We use the “0” category 
for size (no tangible incentives) as the reference category against which we evaluate the 
effects of the other combinations in the data set (1/0, 1/1, 1/2, 2/1, 2/2, 3/1, and 3/2). 
 
The indicator most often used for economic development is income, measured as gross 
domestic product per capita. For the analysis, we use GDP p.c. on purchasing-power-
parity base, in logs (to base 10). We computed a purchasing power-corrected series in 
1995 international US$ from data on constant (kd) and current (cd) US$ total GDPs given 
in the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005). Data are available from 1988 
onwards for Bulgaria, Cyprus, Algeria, Egypt, Georgia, Hungary, Israel, Jordan, Latvia, 
Morocco, Slovakia, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey. For other countries, we had to fill the   17
gaps. As a general rule, we assume that purchasing power parities remained about the 
same during the pre-transition period. That allows us to re-calculate PPP series with 
market-price growth data. Regarding the former Soviet Union, these are given for 
Georgia, Latvia, Estonia and the Russian Federation and we calculate a weighted 
average; regarding Czech Republic, we use growth rates given for the Slovak Republic. 
For Poland 1988-90, we use growth rates given for Hungary.
6  
 
Some authors (e.g. Diamond 1992) propose using other indicators like the Human 
Development Index or the Physical Quality of Life Index, which produce better results 
than GDP per capita because they capture levels of absolute poverty and human 
deprivation better. The data for these alternative indicators, however, are not available for 
all countries of this study for the entire period of time. As an alternative, we use life 
expectancy at birth (World Bank 2005) as a second variable for economic development. 
 
The measurement of linkage presented us with more difficulties because data availability 
for such transnational interactions as visits, communication, or academic exchange 
proved extremely limited given the extensive empirical scope of our study. Except for 
trade, we therefore turn to proxies based on the assumption that the intensity of linkages 
increases with geographical proximity.  
 
For trade linkage, we use each country’s trade with the EU based on Feenstra (2000). 
The time range is from 1985 to 1997, and “EU trade” is operationalized as the share of 
the sum of exports to and imports from EU15 to the total sum of exports and imports. 
                                                 
6 See Scholtz (2006) for more detail.   18
Feenstra covers all countries, but in their pre-1990 boundaries. We take predecessor 
states’ values as proxies for their successor states’ values in all cases (Czechoslovakia, 
Yugoslavia, and Soviet Union). We assume all countries to keep (in 1998 and later) those 
values they had obtained in 1996/97 (the average of these two years). 
 
For geographical proximity to democratic countries, we use two measures. On the one 
hand, we distinguish direct land neighbors of the EU from those that are separated from 
the EU by the sea or other countries (the reference category). By including geographical 
proximity to the EU as well as trade with the EU, we control for general effects 
emanating from international interactions with the EU and its member states as opposed 
to the EU’s political conditionality in particular. On the other hand, and inspired by 
Gleditsch and Ward (2006), we calculate a democratic-neighbors ratio for each country 
and year under observation. We divide the number of democratic neighbors of a country 
by the number of total (land) neighbors. In line with the hypothesis on the intensity of 
linkages with democratic countries, we assume that the frequency and consistency of 
democracy-promoting transnational interactions increases with the democratic-neighbors 
ratio. 
 
By contrast, we decided against taking into account other specific influences emanating 
from nation-states or international organizations. Existing studies of EU democracy 
promotion in the candidate countries that compare EU impact with the impact of other 
international organizations or the United States as a major international promoter of 
democracy (Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Schimmelfennig et al.   19
2006) reveal three major findings. First, the Western nation-states have generally 
delegated the task of democracy promotion to the regional organizations and worked 
through these organizations rather than through bilateral programs. The democracy 
promotion efforts of regional organizations clearly outweigh national efforts. Second, 
those international organizations that do not offer tangible material or political incentives 
to the states of the region (such as the Council of Europe or the OSCE) have not been 
effective in promoting democratic change against domestic obstacles. Third, EU and 
NATO conditionality have been working in parallel, using the same conditions and 
incentives. Thus, their effects are often difficult to disentangle. However, NATO 
conditionality has generally been less strict than, and often followed the lead of, EU 
conditionality. For most candidates for EU and NATO membership, economic concerns 
have been more important than security concerns. For these reasons, we assume that EU 
political conditionality has outweighed the influence of other international organizations 
on democratization in the European Neighborhood. We therefore do not explicitly control 
for the impact of other international organizations. 
 
We do control, however, for time dependency by including a variable measuring the year 
of observation and for regional dependency by including a dummy for the Islamic 
Mediterranean countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, and Turkey). These countries are assumed to differ in 
the conditions of democratization from the Eastern European countries for cultural 
reasons: The Islamic world appears to be particularly resistant to the waves of   20
democratization that have rolled through the international system. We therefore expect a 
negative effect of membership in the Islamic world on democratization.  
 
Influences promoting democracy take some time to come into effect. Change is most 
likely to take place as a result of elections leading to the defeat of less democratic 
incumbents or, in the case of election fraud, to popular unrest causing the downfall of the 
old regime. In accordance with the standard four-year electoral rhythm, we expect the 
empirical relations to be highest with using a time lag of four years. That is, we correlate 
the independent variables for one year (and country) with the democracy measure four 
years later. This effectively restricts our period of analysis from 1988 to 2000 for the 
independent variables. Again, in order to check the robustness of our findings, we tried 
other lags as well. 
 
We use a random effects probit estimation to account both for the ordinal structure of the 
democracy measurement and for the panel structure of the data, using Stata’s GLLAMM 
module. In this estimation, the country variable is used as a unit identifier in a multi-level 
probit regression. The ordered probit estimation accounts correctly for the Likert-like 
nature of Freedom House's democracy data, which are both stepwise and censored. On 
the other hand, the special time structure which implies a special sequential order of time 
points is not accounted for. Except for the discontinuous nature of revolutions, growth 
models are not applicable, and better estimation procedures are not available. 
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Finally, we estimated both level and change models. In the first case, we seek to explain 
the effect of our independent variables on the level of democracy in our cases. The level 
is measured by our adapted absolute Freedom House score. In the latter case, we seek to 
explain the change in democracy levels from the previous year. 
 
4. Results 
Level of political rights model 
Table 2 reports the regression results for our standard analysis, which uses the level of 
Political Rights as the dependent variable for all countries.  
 
The first estimation (1) focuses on our main explanatory variable, the size and credibility 
of EU incentives. For low incentive sizes, the effect is not entirely consistent but in 
general it increases primarily with the size of incentives and secondarily with the 
credibility of incentives. That is, for each size of incentives, higher credibility has a 
stronger positive impact on democracy. From highly credible association upwards, the 
effect of conditionality is significant, strong, and consistent. 
 
Model (2) includes the modernization and linkage controls. For all variables except the 
EU trade share, the coefficients have the correct sign and prove significant at the 1 
percent level. As expected, economic development and the intensity of transnational 
interactions (again except for trade) are significantly correlated with levels of democracy. 
At the same time, however, the effects of these mechanisms do not reduce the 
significance of conditionality. They even improve the performance of the conditionality   22
variables. In particular, it seems that accounting for the particular problem of 
democratizing the “Islamic Mediterranean” countries turns the negative signs of some of 
the conditionality coefficient positive. Yet, the effects of conditionality below the 
threshold of credible association remain inconsistent. 
 
Table 2: Regression results: Levels of Political Rights for all countries 
 (1)  (2)  (2a)  (2b)  (2c) 
Dependent Variable  Freedom House Political Rights 
Lag length  4 years  4 years  4 years  4 years  4 years 
GDP p.c., ppp, log    1.479*** 0.446*  0.139  1.503*** 
   (3.870) (1.716) (0.533) (5.447) 
Life expectancy     0.469*** 0.073**  0.025  0.136*** 
At birth, total (years)    (11.277) (2.244) (0.720)  (5.100) 
Islamic     -2.131*** -1.321*** 0.000  -1.610*** 
Mediterranean   (6.789) (2.741)  (.)  (6.982) 
Democratic    1.198***  -0.252 -0.566  0.880*** 
Neighbors   (2.863) (0.725) (1.582) (2.754) 
Proximity to EU     0.766***  -0.339* -0.525*** 0.445** 
Direct land border    (3.554) (1.758) (2.644) (2.535) 
EU-Trade,     -1.299* 0.419  0.481  -2.173*** 
Share of total trade    (1.954) (0.986) (1.153) (3.967) 
Partnership (1),   -1.040**  1.420**  -0.611 -0.363  1.332** 
no credibility (0)  (2.007)  (2.284) (1.588) (0.888) (2.459) 
Partnership (1),  -0.007  0.987* -0.585* -0.213  0.917* 
low credibility (1)  (0.014)  (1.685) (1.647) (0.563) (1.707) 
Partnership (1),  0.739  1.549***  0.397 0.340 0.742 
high credibility (2)  (1.413)  (2.663) (1.492) (1.327) (1.407) 
Association (2),  -0.931  0.911 -0.782*  -0.570  1.739*** 
low credibility (1)  (1.548)  (1.278) (1.915) (1.339) (2.889) 
Association (2),  1.674***  1.768*** 0.726** 0.592** 2.299*** 
high credibility (2)  (2.763)  (2.738) (2.568) (2.172) (3.959) 
EU Membership (3),  2.915***  3.308*** 1.251*** 1.082*** 3.093*** 
low credibility (1)  (5.122)  (5.162) (4.396) (3.926) (5.734) 
EU Membership (3),  4.188***  4.406*** 1.402*** 1.216*** 3.242*** 
high credibility (2)  (6.348)  (6.181) (4.784) (4.279) (5.854) 
Year  -0.069**  -0.108*** -0.020 -0.001  -0.108*** 
 (2.500)  (3.749) (1.581) (0.105) (4.508) 
Constant    36.929  3.388  203.710*** 
    (1.479)  (0.137)  (4.280) 
Observations 388  388 388 388 388 
Estimation RE  oprob  RE oprob  RE linear FE linear  OLS 
R-squared         0.686 
      
t-/z-values in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** at 5%; *** at 1% 
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Estimations (2a) to (2c) test the robustness of these results against changes in estimation 
method; another reason for their inclusion is the fact that the coefficients in the ordered 
probit model relate to the estimated threshold values (‘cut points’) for the different Likert 
scale steps which do not add up to the same difference of six between the extremes 0 
(completely non-democratic) to 6 (fully democratic). Estimation 2a uses a random effects 
model which assumes the between-country effects to be distributed following the same 
distribution as the within-country effects. Estimation 2b treats the panel structure of the 
data using a fixed-effects model which studies only the within-country effects, i.e. the 
changes over time, leaving the between-country (i.e. cross-national comparative) effects 
out of study. Both estimation produce less satisfying results than random-effects ordered 
probit model but the results for conditionality remain substantively unchanged. 
 
How substantive are the conditionality effects? As stated above, the coefficients of the 
random-effects ordered probit estimation are difficult to interpret and appear to be 
inflated. Estimation 2c therefore uses a simple ordinary least squares estimation – its 
coefficients are most easily interpreted and show that countries, which are offered a 
credible EU membership perspective, are on average more three points above those 
without tangible EU incentives (on the seven point Freedom House political rights scale). 
 
To further test the robustness of these results, we apply several changes to the model 
used. Estimation 3 in Table 3 increases the time lag from four to five years. This reduces 
the significance of the higher conditionality values but the signs remain correct and 
accession conditionality still remains statistically significant.    24
Table 3: Regression results: Robustness tests 
 (3)  (4)  (5)    (6) 
Dependent Variable  FH Political  
Rights 
FH Civil  
Liberties 
FH Political 
Rights,  
only non-
democratic 
target 
countries 
  FH Political 
Rights, change
Lag Length  5 years  4 years  4 years    4 years 
GDP p.c., ppp, log  1.387*** 1.773*** 1.872***  GDP p.c., ppp,   0.212 
 (3.120)  (4.980)  (4.081)  log,  change (0.232) 
Life expectancy   0.355*** 0.171*** 0.175***  Life exp. at birth,   -0.178 
at birth, total (years)  (8.265)  (4.003)  (4.364)  total (yrs.) , change (1.251) 
Islamic Mediterranean  -2.135*** -1.606*** -1.781***    
 (5.793)  (5.597)  (4.755)    
Democratic Neighbors  1.770***  0.356 0.539  Democratic    -0.039 
 (3.517)  (0.684)  (0.939)  Neighbors,  change (0.035) 
Proximity to EU,   0.490**  -0.209  -0.328  Prox. to EU, direct  1.013 
direct land border  (2.048)  (0.930) (1.128)  land  border,  change (1.415) 
EU-Trade,   1.849**  -0.336  0.162  EU-Trade, share of  3.155** 
Share of total trade  (2.506)  (0.528)  (0.206)  total trade, change (2.135) 
Partnership (1),  -0.277  -1.806***  -1.098 Partnership  (1),  -0.010 
no credibility (0)  (0.403)  (2.984)  (1.493)  no cred., change (0.008) 
Partnership (1),  -1.521**  -1.100*  -0.749  Partnership (1), low  0.144 
low credibility (1)  (2.429)  (1.774)  (1.143)  cred. (1) , change (0.184) 
Partnership (1),  0.194  -0.458  0.959  Partnersh. (1), high  0.782 
high credibility (2)  (0.321)  (0.793)  (1.485)  cred. (2) , change (1.370) 
Association (2),  -0.903  -2.632*** -1.420*  Association  (2), 
low 
0.119 
low credibility (1)  (1.131)  (3.690)  (1.669)  cred. (1) , change (0.089) 
Association (2),  1.000  0.723  1.424  Assoc. (2), high  1.118 
high credibility (2)  (1.447)  (1.065)  (1.597)  cred. (2) , change (1.521) 
EU Membership (3),  1.230*  0.989  3.096***  EU Memb. (3), low  1.356* 
low credibility (1)  (1.822)  (1.603)  (4.188)  cred. (1) , change (1.934) 
EU Membership (3),  1.694** 2.078*** 5.351***  EU Memb. (3), 
high 
2.111*** 
high credibility (2)  (2.340)  (2.596)  (5.066)  cred. (2), change (2.707) 
Year -0.018  0.057* -0.089***  Year, change  -0.003 
 (0.535)  (1.889)  (2.674)    (0.142) 
Observations 352  388  280  367 
Estimation REoprob  REoprob  REoprob    REoprob 
 
 
Model 4 changes the dependent variables from Political Rights to Civil Liberties, thus 
covering a different dimension of liberal democracy. This reduces the significance of 
conditionality further; only highly credible accession conditionality retains a significant 
impact (the signs remain correct, however). Most of the other variables lose their 
statistical significance as well – only the economic development measures and the   25
Islamic Mediterranean dummy remain robustly significant across different model 
specifications. Model 5 shows that the results do not substantially change when the 
analysis is limited to non-democratic target countries. Whereas high-incentive 
conditionality and economic development remain highly significant, the linkage variables 
prove insignificant or have the wrong sign. Finally, the last column in Table 3 presents 
the estimations for the change or first differences model. Only the change to membership 
incentives is significant according to this model (as is a change in the EU trade share). 
 
5. Conclusions 
Is EU democracy promotion in its neighborhood effective? And if so why? This study 
started from findings established by recent comparative case studies of EU democracy 
and human rights promotion: that the EU has successfully promoted democracy in its 
neighborhood; that it owes its success to the use of political conditionality; and that the 
effectiveness of political conditionality depends on a credible perspective for the target 
countries of democracy promotion. It has been the main purpose of this study to put these 
findings to a demanding test, first, by controlling for economic development and 
transnational linkages as alternative mechanisms of democratization and, second, by 
conducting a panel analysis for a large number of target countries (36) in the European 
neighborhood and across a long time period (13 years). 
 
We conclude from our analysis that EU political conditionality has passed this test. 
Across a variety of model specifications, EU conditionality has proven to be a robustly 
significant correlate of democratization in the European neighborhood. The analysis   26
furthermore corroborated the relevance of a credible accession perspective. 
Conditionality below the incentive level of credible association did not perform 
consistently better than no or weak conditionality. Starting from highly credible 
association conditionality, however, the effects have been generally strong and 
significant. The credible membership perspective proved highly significant in all model 
specifications – and consistently stronger than lower levels of conditionality. 
 
The other mechanisms of democratization were included in the analysis as controls rather 
than as test variables in their own right. That economic development proved to be an 
equally robust correlate of democratization as accession conditionality was not surprising 
in view of the overwhelming empirical evidence supporting modernization theory. The 
linkage variables, by contrast, lacked robustness. The share of EU trade failed completely 
as an explanatory variable. We did not, however, test directly for transnational 
transactions but used spatial proxies. Therefore, the results should not be interpreted as 
weakening the linkage approach. 
 
Our final conclusions pertain to policy. The study confirms the utmost importance of a 
membership perspective if EU political conditionality is to have a strong and reliable 
impact on democratization in its neighborhood. The new European Neighborhood Policy, 
which has only become operative in 2005, has not been the subject of this analysis. It 
would, however, be classified as a low-credibility association policy because it explicitly 
excludes a membership perspective for the ENP countries and does not set high political   27
standards for participation. If this analysis has any predictive value, ENP is thus doomed 
to fail on average as a policy of democracy promotion. 
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Appendix A    List of neighbourhood countries 
 
 
1 Albania 
2 Algeria 
3 Armenia 
4 Azerbaijan 
5 Belarus 
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina 
7 Bulgaria 
8 Croatia 
9 Czech  Republic 
10 Egypt 
11 Estonia 
12 Georgia 
13 Hungary 
14 Israel 
15 Jordan 
16 Kazakhstan 
17 Kyrgyzstan 
18 Latvia 
19 Lebanon 
20 Lithuania 
21   Macedonia 
22 Moldova 
23   Morocco 
24 Poland 
25 Romania 
26 Russia 
27 Slovakia 
28 Slovenia 
29 Syria 
30 Tajikistan 
31 Tunisia 
32 Turkey 
33 Turkmenistan 
34 Ukraine 
35 Uzbekistan 
36   Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
Montenegro)   31
Appendix B    EU incentives, observed states for 36 countries, 1988-2000 
 
     Credibility   
   0  1  2 
0  Albania (1988); Bulgaria (1988); Poland (1988); Romania (1988-89); Yugoslavia (1988) 
1  Algeria (1988-94); Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (1992-
95); Egypt (1988-94); Is-
rael (1988-94); Jordan 
(1988-94); Lebanon (1988-
94); Morocco (1988-94); 
Syria (1988-94); Tunisia 
(1988-94) 
Algeria (1995-2000); Armenia (1992-2000); 
Azerbaijan (1992-2000); Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (1996-99); Croatia (1992-99); 
Egypt (1995-2000); Georgia (1992-2000); 
Hungary (1988); Kazakhstan (1992-2000); 
Kyrgyz Republic (1992-2000); Moldova 
(1992-2000); Russian Federation (1991-
2000); Tajikistan (1992-2000); 
Turkmenistan (1992-2000); Ukraine (1992-
2000); Uzbekistan (1992-2000) 
Albania (1989-99); Belarus (1992-
2001); Bulgaria (1989); Croatia (1992-
99); Estonia (1991-92); Hungary 
(1989); Latvia (1991-92); Lithuania 
(1991-92); Macedonia (1992-99); 
Poland (1989-89); Slovenia (1991-92); 
Yugoslavia (1989-99) 
2 (n.a.)  Israel (1995-2000); Jordan (1995-2000); 
Lebanon (1995-2000); Morocco (1995-
2000); Syria (1995-2000); Tunisia (1995-
2000) 
Bulgaria (1990-92); Hungary (1990-
92); Poland (1990-92); Romania 
(1990-92) 
I
n
c
e
n
t
i
v
e
s
 
3  (n.a.)  Albania (2000); Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2000); Bulgaria (1993-96); Croatia (2000); 
Estonia (1993-97); Latvia (1993-96); Lith-
uania (1993-96); Macedonia (2000); 
Romania (1993-96); Slovenia (1993-96); 
Turkey (1988-99); Yugoslavia (2000) 
Bulgaria (1997-2000); Czech Republic 
(1993-2000); Estonia (1997-2000); 
Hungary (1993-2000); Latvia (1997-
2000); Lithuania (1997-2000); Poland 
(1993-2000); Romania (1997-2000); 
Slovak Republic (1993-2000); Slovenia 
(1997-2000); Turkey (2000) 
 